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Federal Law Enforcement: 
Law Enforcement as Political Question 
 
Zachary S. Price1 
 
What authority do federal courts have to review executive 
nonenforcement choices? On the one hand, the Supreme Court has 
deemed prosecutorial discretion “exclusive” and “absolute,” 
interpreted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to 
presumptively bar judicial review of nonenforcement, and severely 
limited Article III standing to challenge government inaction.2 On the 
other hand, the Court has indicated that agencies cannot “simply . . . 
disregard statutory responsibilities,” suggested that they cannot adopt 
policies that “abdicat[e]” enforcement, and at least entertained the 
possibility of tort damages for nonenforcement.3 At the same time, 
the Court has repeatedly coupled assertions of executive authority 
with descriptions of enforcement discretion as “unsuitable” for 
judicial review,4 leaving it unclear whether executive 
nonenforcement authority is unreviewable because it is absolute, or 
only absolute insofar as it is unreviewable. 
Clarifying the boundaries of judicial power over executive 
enforcement has nevertheless gained new urgency, as a result of 
executive initiatives aimed at converting enforcement discretion into 
a more consequential policy tool. The Obama Administration 
adopted controversial nonenforcement policies relating to marijuana, 
immigration, and implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
The Trump Administration seems poised to follow suit. President 
Trump already issued one executive order all but directing agencies 
to decline enforcement of key ACA provisions, and his 
administration’s deregulatory bent will likely result in deliberate 
under-enforcement of disfavored regulatory and statutory 
requirements. 
                                                 
1. Summarized and excerpted from Zachary S. Price, Law 
Enforcement as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1571 (2016). 
2. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1992); Heckler 
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683, 693 (1974). 
3. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761, 765 (2005); 
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4. 
4. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832–33. 
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In future litigation, courts should recognize that law enforcement 
implicates the political-question doctrine. Under the Constitution’s 
directive that the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,”5 the executive branch is duty-bound to execute the laws 
Congress enacts, whether or not executive officials approve of those 
laws and even if they must exercise discretion in doing so. 
Nevertheless, courts confront very real practical and institutional 
challenges in adjudicating disputes about the faithful execution of 
prohibitory statutes by enforcement officials. As a result, executive 
nonenforcement authority is best understood as an area, much like 
certain other core executive functions, where institutional limitations 
on courts place a gap between what executive officials ideally should 
do and what courts may require of them. The twin criteria primarily 
used to identify political questions—“textual assignment” to a 
political branch and the absence of “judicially manageable 
standards”6—provide key guideposts for the limits on judicial power 
over executive enforcement. This framework may account 
descriptively for much of the key current case law while also 
pointing the way to appropriate normative resolutions of disputed 
questions. 
 
A Political-Question Framework 
 
The animating idea of the political-question doctrine is that some 
legal obligations are inappropriate for judicial resolution. The 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions have emphasized two 
considerations. First, the Court has asked whether the Constitution 
includes a “textually demonstrable . . . commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department.”7 Second, the court has asked 
whether courts “lack judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving” the issue.8 This factor seems to turn 
ultimately on a judgment of relative institutional competence—a 
determination that judicial line-drawing would infringe on judgments 
that another branch is better positioned to make. 
                                                 
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
6. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 (2012); Nixon v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993). 
7. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228. 
8. Id. 
 2017] The Judges’ Book 53 
 
 
Can law-enforcement choices qualify as political questions by 
these standards? In some contexts, the answer is yes. As one 
example, because the Take Care Clause “textually assigns” the power 
to initiate enforcement suits to the executive branch, courts should 
lack authority to compel executive officials to bring particular 
enforcement suits before them. As another example, because 
deciding whether to enforce a given law in a given case typically 
“involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors that are 
peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise,” courts will generally lack 
“judicially manageable standards for judging how and when an 
agency should exercise its discretion” over enforcement.9 Second-
guessing executive enforcement choices under real-world conditions 
would typically involve courts in the sort of unprincipled line-
drawing that courts more generally describe as judicially 
unmanageable. 
The Supreme Court’s twin criteria for non-justiciable political 
questions thus help explain and rationalize courts’ general reluctance 
to intrude on executive enforcement choices. Yet framing the 
problem this way also has important normative implications, for both 
courts and the executive branch. 
 
Judicial Power and Executive Duty 
 
One key implication is that courts’ analysis of enforcement 
questions should not fully define how executive officials understand 
their own obligations. Deciding that some legal obligation is not 
judicially enforceable is different from determining that no legal 
obligation has been breached. Indeed, one key purpose of deeming 
the question political is to impose accountability more squarely on 
the branch that made the determination in the first place. Here, as 
with other political questions, the reasons for limited judicial review 
depend principally upon institutional limitations on courts rather than 




The framework also helps identify enforcement decisions that 
may properly be subject to judicial review because problems of 
                                                 
9. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832–33. 
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textual assignment and judicial unmanageability are absent. At least 
two types of general enforcement policies may present appropriate 
questions for judicial review under the APA or other applicable 
statutes. 
First, policies that purport to change the law itself, rather than 
simply to forbear from enforcing it, require more specific statutory 
authority than mere organic agency enforcement discretion. By 
invalidating such policies, and thereby restoring the deterrent effect 
of underlying prohibitions, courts may enforce the most important 
substantive limit on executive enforcement discretion: that as a 
default matter, enforcement discretion is an authority to ignore but 
not authorize, to allocate effort but not to change effective governing 
law. 
Second, policies that functionally alter governing legal 
requirements by definitively specifying the government’s 
enforcement plans should also be subject to judicial review and 
invalidation in at least the clearest cases. Insofar as such policies do 
not formally alter underlying legal requirements, in principle they 
may leave regulated parties exposed to enforcement in the future if 
the government shifts its priorities. In practice, however, such 
policies may well be perceived as a green light to violate substantive 
prohibitions with impunity. To forestall that result and preserve the 
underlying law’s deterrent effect, courts should review and invalidate 
such policies. Even if doing so does not result directly in any 
particular enforcement action being brought, wiping away such 
overly permissive policies may help preserve the ultimate primacy of 
substantive law over executive policy in determining regulated 
parties’ behavior. 
 
Deferred Action Agreements 
 
A third implication of the framework is that Congress may 
enable a broader judicial role with respect to nonenforcement if it so 
chooses. Because problems of judicial unmanageability result 
principally from Congress’s failure to specify which violations 
executive officials should prioritize, nothing in the Constitution 
precludes Congress from authorizing broader judicial review, as long 
as Congress stops short of requiring judicially compelled 
prosecution.  
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In at least one important context, approval of so-called “deferred 
prosecution agreements” (DPAs), Congress has effectively done just 
that, yet some courts have persisted in rubber-stamping the parties’ 
proposals, presumably out of a misplaced fear of interfering with 
prosecutorial discretion. Such agreements allow the government to 
file criminal charges against a suspected wrongdoer and yet defer 
actual prosecution without falling afoul of otherwise-applicable 
statutory deadlines for proceeding to trial. Prosecutors have 
increasingly used such agreements as a tool for imposing extensive 
internal changes at corporations suspected of criminal wrongdoing, 
yet some past DPAs have included terms bearing no evident relation 
to assuring future compliance with the statutes being enforced. 
Because the statute in question specifically requires court approval of 
such agreements, and because exercising review in this context 
presents no problem of judicial unmanageability or compelled 
prosecution, courts should not hesitate to exercise this authority to 




Finally, the framework developed here could support recognizing 
broader Article III standing to bring suits challenging executive 
inaction. In key standing decisions, the Supreme Court has invoked 
concerns about judicial interference with executive enforcement 
discretion as a reason to limit standing to challenge exercises of that 
discretion.10 Yet viewing law enforcement as a political question 
responds more directly to such concerns about improper judicial 
oversight of fundamentally executive functions. Accordingly, instead 
of a hard Article III limit on standing to challenge executive inaction, 
courts should shift focus to elaborating presumptive, congressionally 
defeasible limits on who may sue to challenge executive 




Overall, the framework developed here underscores that within 
our system of coequal branches and separated powers, courts cannot 
enforce every obligation; some obligations should be left to public 
                                                 
10. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). 
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officials’ accountability and conscience. But by the same token, in 
law enforcement, as in other areas, the political branches should 
recognize that the limits of judicial supervision are not necessarily 
the limits of the law. 
 
 
